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Abstract
Iudividuals frequently transfer commodities without an explicit contract
or an implicit enforcement mechanisnt. We design an experimr.uL to study
whether such commodity transfers can be viewed as investments basecí on
trust aud reciprocity, or whether they rather resemble presents with dis-
tributioual intentions. Our experiment essentially modifies Berg et al.'s
investruent game by introducíng an upper bound to what. a contributor
can be repaid afterwards. By varying this upper bound, extreme situa-
tirnrs such as unrestricted repayment and no repayment (dictator giving)
can be approximated without alt.ering the verbal instructions otherwise.
Our results show that individuals contribute more when large repayments
are feasible. Tlris is consistent with the tntst- and reciprocity hypothe-
sis. Although distributional coucerus in some contributions can be traced,
they are not uearly close to a preference for equal payoffs.
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1 Introduction
Due to transaction costs individuals are usually nut able to specify all the
details of an agreement in a legally binding contract. At best, the contract
i, incomplete and often transactions are not governed by any contract at all.
This observation raises impvrtant issues about individual behavior. Do people
use implicit enforcement mechanisms in their long tetm relationships'? Or are
people motivatecí by other goals than pure rnaterial self-interest'? People may
not only care about, their own material payoffs, but also about the distribution of
the payoffs between each other. In addition, people may take decisions based on
trust and reciprocity. This means that they care about each other's intentions
that give rise to their payoffs and distribution.l
[n an inHuential rrcent expeilment, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995)
study an investment game. In t.his game, a contributor C vwns an amount
of rnone,y and can choose to contribute a certain amount c to a reciprocator
R. This contributivn is then tripled, and R can choose tv repay any amount
r with 0 c r C 3c to C. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is
obvious: R will not send any money to C in the second stage. Realizing that,
C will not give mone,y to R in the Hrst stage. Berg et al. focus on the role
oP trust aud reciprocity in this investment setting. The game is well suited
far this purpose: there are large potential gains from trade, yet couttactual
precommitment is uot possible and implicit enforcement mechanisms that might,
arise from repeated game reput.ation effects or ptmishment threats are ruled
out.Z Berg et al.'s experimental data confinn a list of predictions implied by the
trust and reciprocity model. For example, contributors generally send positive
amounts of mouey, and rr,~ciprocators are often found to senri back more than
the~- receivecl.'s
~Recent examples of model.c in which distributional concerns are important are Fehr and
Kirchsteiger (1994) and Fehr and Schmidt (1998).For models of reciprocity, see for example
Bolton and OckenfeLc (1997) or Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (7998).
~Reputation effects are ruled out because índividuals can play the game only once. Pun-
ishment threats are avoided by guaranteeing full anonirttity.
3Several other suthors have conducted experimental studies in which aspects of trust,
reciprocity and efficiency are key features. See, for example, Fehr, Kirch.Rteiger and Riedl
(1993), Fehr, Giichter and Kirchsteiger (1997), Guth, OckenfeLs and Wendel (1994), McKelvey
and P21frey (1992). The explicit focus in our paper is on the role of trust and reciyrocity vetsus2
However, Berg et al.'s analysis does not necessarily rule out the possibility of
pure distributional concerns (fairness) as an alternative explanation for observed
behavior in the investment game. While their dat.a cuufirm several predictions
of the trust and reciprocity model, they are generally also not inconsistent. with
a model in wlrich individuals simply care about distributional aspects of realized
gains. In this paper, we modify the investment game in such a way that we
can study whether individuals really invest based on trust and reciprocity, or
whether they merely provide presents to each other, based on a distributional
coucern for fairness.
A}irst. way to study the role of distributional concerns as a possible expla-
uation for Berg et al.'s findings is by comparing the investment game with a
different game in which repayment by R ís impossible. If payments by C would
retnain high m this different gaute, tlren one may vicw C's behavior mainly as
a refiection of distributional concerns. One problem with such an experiment is
t.hat the two different games rely on different verbal instructions: repayments
are not mentioned at all in the treatment where they are impossible. Con-
sequently, the results of the two games are not really comparable, since the
iudívicíuals may have been induced by t.he instructions to think in a certain
wav.
In the experiatent of this paper we avoid differences in verbal instructions by
introducing in the standard investment game an upper bound r for repayments
from R to C. TLe upper bound ~~ is our treatment variable. It can be varied
systematically to study the potential distributional concerns in the investme,nt
game, while at the same time keeping the verbal framing the same. If the
upper bound ~i~ is close to the maximum possible repayment, the original set-up
of Berg et al. is approxitnated. In contrast, ifi~ is close to zero, the treatment of
no possible repayment. is approached. From the extent to which contributions
and repayments differ across the alternative treatments we can learn the role of
trust and reciprocity versus distributional concerns in the investment setting.
In section 2 we describe our experimental procedures and formulate some
Lypotheses. Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Concluding remarks
follow in section 4.
pure distriLutional concerns.3
2 Experimental procedure and hypotheses
The investment game is played as follows. Each contríbutor C has an initial
enduwment of 10 chips, and must decide how much tu send to the reciprocator
R. Denote the actual amount contributed by c, which can be any integer
satisfying 0 C c c 10. The amount contributed is then doubled to 2c and
received by R, who must then decide whether and how much to repay to C.
The repayment is denot,ed by r(2c), and can be any integer amount such that
0 c r(2c) G min {i~, 2c}. The instruction and decision sheets, for r- 2, are
procided in the Appendix.
The experiment was performed in 1997 at Tilburg University. There are
three treatments, in each of which 16 pairs of inidviduals participated. Hence,
a total of 96 undergraduate participants were recruited. Our treatment variable
is i-, which can take three possible values:
("nearly no repayment" ),
("full repayment"),
("nearly full sharing").
Of course, our terminology refers to the maximal repayment that is feasible,
and not to what is actually done. The value per chip is 2 guilders~, for both
players C and R. The payoffs in chips are 10 - c f t~ for C ancí 2c - r for
R. Note that implicit enfotcement mechanisrns are ruled out, by guaranteeing
anunimity and not repeating the experiment. The possibility of learning is not
considered.
It is possible to formulate several alternative hypotheses about the indi-
viduals' behavior. The treat.ment variable r will be particularly important in
this respect. A first hypothesis is that individuals behave according to the tra-
cíitioual concept of subgame perfect, equilibrium. If this is the case, then C
contributes c- 0, and R repays r~(2c) - 0 if 2c 1 0.
TLe next. hyputhesis is t.hat individuals behave according to the predictions
uf the trust and reciprocity model. The basic model is discussed in detail
in Berg et aL Some of the predictions need to be modified in our context,
since there is an upper bound r to what R can repay. In particular, trust and
"At the time of our experiment, 1 dollar - 1.8 yntilder.reciprocity now predicts that C conttibutes a positive amount, but not exceeding
the upper óound T that R can repny, so 0 c c G r. Correspondingly, one may
expect. low contributions c if r is small, and larger contributions as r increases.
Furt.hermore, R may be expected to repay an amount r(2c) ~ c if there is
full reciprocity, ot at least a positive amount if there is partial reciprocity. A
positive correlation between c and r(2c) may also be expected.
The final hypothesis is that individuals behave according to distributional
cnnsiderations. This model is distinct from the ttust and reciprocity model in
several respects. It predicts that C contributes a positive amount 0 c c c
10. Hence, it is possible that, c~ r, in contrast to the trust and reciprocity
hypothesis. Furthermore, contributions should no longer necessarily increase as
i~ increases if C behaves altruistically. Finally, R sends back an amount r(2c)
tu guarantee a more or less "fai~" distribution of thc final outcome, rather thsn
tu provide a reasonable rate of return on C's initial investment contribution.
Preferences for equal payoJJs are perhaps the most natural example of con-
cerns for distribution or fairness. To achieve equal payoffs one way or another,
it is necessary that C contributes a minimum amount of c~ 3.33: R can then
repa,y a positive amount r-(-10 f 3c)~2 to yield equal payoffs for both. An
interesting special case of preferences for equal payoffs obtains when individuals
obtain a Pareto-ef8cient outcome under tlte equal payoff constraint. It can eas-
ily be verified that this amounts to maximiring the joint profits, 10-1-c, subject
to the constraint that payoffs are equal, i.e. 10 - c f r(2c) - 2c - r(2c), or
2r(2c) - 3c - lll, and the feasibility constraints, 0 G c G 10 and 0 C r(2c) G
min {i~, 2c}. The solution to this program is: c-(10 f 2r)~3 and r(2c) - r if
i~G10;andc-r-l0ifr~10.
3 Results
Table 1 provides all the data of our experiment. For each of the three treat-
ments, 10 pairs of individuals have been matched. The actual contributions, c,
and the corresponding repayment r(2c), are listed in increasing order. At the
bottom of each column, the average contribution 0c, the average repayment 0r
and the average repayment ratio ~r~c are given.5
Table 1. Contributions and repayments
repayment bound i~ - 2 r- 10 i~ - 18
subject r. r c r c r
1 1 0 3 0 3 3
2 1 1 4 1 3 3
3 1 1 4 2 3 5
9 1 1 5 0 3 5
5 1 2 5 2 4 4
6 1 2 5 2 5 0
7 1 2 5 3 5 4
8 2 1 5 5 5 4
9 2 1 5 5 5 4
10 2 2 7 7 5 5
11 2 2 8 4 5 10
12 3 1 8 8 6 5
13 3 1 10 0 8 5
19 3 1 10 5 10 5
15 3 2 10 5 10 10
1(i 5 2 10 10 10 10
0c,l~r 2.000 1.375 6.500 3.688 5.625 5.125
0c~r 0.879 0.591 0.981
The predtct~ons of the subgatne perfection equilibrium are clearly rejected.
As in Berg et al., both C and R usually send positive amounts. Are the results
cousisteut with the predictions of t.he trust and reciprocity hypothesis'? The
evidence on the coutributors' side seems indeed roughly consistent with it. In
particular, the average contribution 0c is significantly larger if i~ - 10 or ~- - 18
than if i~ - 2. Hence, contributors .qenernlly seern to care nbout what the~ can
receave Gack. Note that the average contribution under i~ - 10 cíoes not. differ
significantly from the one uncíer r- 18. This suggests that the contributors do
not perceive the upper bound on repayment, r- 10, as a binding constraint to
R (i.e. I{ is uot expected to pay back rnore than 10 anyway).5 The only pieces of
"The~e claims are Laeed on the Mann-Whitney U test, which is a nonparametric tect to6
evidence on the contributors' side against the trust and reciprocity hypothesis
is found in the treatment r- 2: 5 out of 16 coutributors sent more than
tbey could possibly be. repaid: for these individuals other considerations than
inve,tment based on trust are present. Yet notice that even these "generous"
offers generally do not exceed any of the contributions in the second and third
treatrnent, where higher repayments are feasible. The only exception is one
offer of 5 in the 6rst treatment, but even this offer is below the average in the
other two treatments.
What support for the trust and reciprocity hypothesis can be found on the
reciprocators' side? In all three treatments, the average amotmt repaid by R
is less than what wa~s actually received, though the difference is not significant
in the first and the third treatment.s Paying interest is thus rather rare: for
r- '2 it cccuis ~ tirnes in 7 feasible cases, for r é 10 nevei ln 11 cases, and
for ~. - 18 only twice in 16 cases.7 Despite the relatively low repayments, there
is a significantly positive correlation between the contribution c and the repay-
ment r(2c) of 0.528 in the second treat.ment and of0.558 in the third t.reatment
(at significance levels of 0.0317 and 0.0288, respectively).e This suggests that
tliere ntay be at least partial reciprocity in these treatments. In the first treat
ment we estimate a negative, but insignificant correlation between contribution
and repayment of -Q3715 (significance level of 0.2084). This follows from a
presunlably binding upper bound on what R can repay in this treatment.
Finally, to which extent can the results be reconciled with the hypothesis
compare the medians o( pairs of outcomes. 1Ve found z-statistics for significant differences in
contributions of -4.52, -4.22 and 0.98, when cnmparing r- 2 with r- 10, i' - 2 with P- 18.
and F- 10 wit.h ~- 18, respectively. This corresponds to significance levels of 0.0001, 0.0001
and 0-3271.
~The z-statistics for the Man-Whitney L' test for significant differencec Letween contriLu-
tion and repayment are 1.34. 2.53 and .55, in treatment i. - 2, F- 10, and r- 18, respectively.
This corresponds to significance levels of0.1632, 0.0116 and 0.5847.
'Berg et al. oLtained more frequent caces of paying ínterest. This is Lecause their exper-
imental design was made more favourable to high repayments in two respects. First., they
aasume a tripling inetead of a douLGng of the contribution. We preferred to make the pro-
ductivity of investment not too high, since a low contribution may then just Le perceived a5
waateful Lehavinr. Fw~thermore, they endow the reciprocator R wit.h an initial show-up fee.
"We u5e the Spearman rank correlation coefficient to test for the existence of correlation
Letween c and r(2c), using the oLservations of each treatment separately.7
tLat distributiona] considerations are present? Recall t.hat there are L out of 16
contributions in treatment T- 2 that violate the trust and reciprocity model,
aatd that are uot inconsistent with distributiona] considerations. But, as noted
above, even these 5 cases are not that "generous", when they aze compared to
the contribntions of the second and third treatments. To learn more about the
possibílity of distributional considerations, let us focus on outcomes in which C
and R obtain equal payoffs. As explained in the previous section, equal payoffs
are made feasible only if C contributes a minimum amount of 3.33. This occurs
iu only une catie in the first treatment, in 15 cases ín the second treatment, and
iu 12 cases in the third treatment. So in 20 out of 48 cases the contributor
clearly has no preferences for an equal payoff outcome.
Are equal payoffs in fact freyuently achieved, relative to the total number of
ca~,ea iu which it has beem m~de feasible by C? To allow fnr "mistak~" or other
~~.vpects of behavior, let us consider "almost equal payoffs", defined as payoffs
that differ by at most one chip. For a given contribution c, sometimes two
repa,yments r can yield almost equal payoffs, e.g. for c- 7 both repayments
r - 5 and r - 6 would induce "almost equal payoffs". Note that "almost equal
payoHs" are feasible ~~-henever C has contributed a minimum amount of 3. It
can be verified that "almost equal payoffs" occur in only 1 out of 5 feasible cases
in the first treatment; in 6 out of 16 feasible cases in the second treatment; and
in 2 out of 16 cases in the third treatment. Hence, there is little support for a
preference of (almost) equal payoffs by t.he reciprocators.
Using the formula of the previous seckion, Pareto-efficient equal payoffs re-
quire that C contributes c- 5(rounded) for ~~ - 2, and c- 10 for r- 10
and i~ - 18. Only one contributor in the first treatment behaved this way,
compared to respectively four and three contributors in the second and third
treatmcnt. Half of the reciprocators responded by repaying the "almost equal
payoff" amount; the others repaid less.
4 Final Remarks
1Ne have designed an experiment to study whether commodity transfers can be
viewed as investments based on trust and reciprocity, or whether they rather
resemble presents with distributional concerns. By varying the upper boundto what a contributor can be repaid afterwards, extreme situatiais such as
cun~estricted repayment and no repayment can be approsimated without alter-
ing the verbal instructions otherwise. Our results demuustrate that individuals
cout.ribute more when large repayments are feasible than when nearly no repay-
nrent is feasible. This is cousistent with the trust and reciprocity hypothesis.
Although distributional concerns in some contributions can be ttaced, they are
not nearly close to a preference for equal payoffs.
5 Appendix
INSTRUCTIONS (For person A)
In the experiment we will match you with another student at random. You
:u~. stndent A and the other student is student F~. Ynu (person A) wjll receive
10 points, which person B does not rece,ive. We ask you to decide if you want
to give some of the 10 points to the person you are matched with, and if so, to
write the anrount at. the bottom of this page. We wil] collect your form, double
the amocmt you wrote, and give the form to the person you are matched with.
Then persar B with whom you are tnatched, will decide if he~she wants to
giee something back to you (t.his antount will not be doubled). Person B can
give y-ou back at most 2 points (and of course no more than twice the amowtt
yuu gavc).
We will then collect all fonns and pay each of you accordingly.
INSTRUCTIONS (For person B)
In the experiment we will match you with another student at random. You
are student B and the other student is student A. Person A will receive 10
points which you will not receive. We asked person A if he~she wants to give
some of the 10 points to you, and if so, to write down the amount at the bottom
of the page. We will collect the form, double the arnount person A wrote, and
give it to you.
Then. you will dc.ricíe ify ou wacct to give something back to the person A
with whom you are matched (this amount will not be doubled). You can give
back at most 2 points (and of course no more then twice the amount person A
ga~'e i0 VOlI).9
We will then collect all the forms, and pay each of you accordingly.
For student A
Your registration number: ---- .
The number of puints you give to person B with whom you are matched:
For person B
Your registration number: -------- .
The mm~ber of points you give to person A with whom you are rnatched
(no more than twice the number of points person A gave, and no more than 2):
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